Realignment and the Realities of the Middle East

Most diplomats are judged by their ability to stay out of the news, but Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack made headlines this week. Speaking at the Global Security Forum in Doha, he said, "America as the guarantor to the world, for the last 80 years, it is no longer there." Accordingly, the United States is changing its posture in the Middle East. The old arrangement, under which Americans provided security for the region's oil exports, is being restructured. "What's happening in this administration is not an abandonment. It's a message for realignment."

Barrack did not announce a change in policy so much as describe a shift that many Americans have hoped would occur for decades. The U.S. military has enabled its regional allies to break Iran's chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, but if the allies themselves could keep the Middle East relatively tranquil and allow the oil to flow freely, it would relieve a massive headache for Washington. Saudi Arabia's attempt to stop the Houthis from menacing its territory and the Red Sea shipping lanes shows how difficult this will be to accomplish without first defeating Iran.

The Doha remarks did not announce an immediate withdrawal, and the United States is still very active in the region: The military continues to protect ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, a third aircraft-carrier strike group and another Marine expeditionary unit are on their way there as rumors swirl of intense American and Israeli preparations for a post-midterm strike on the Islamic Republic.

American military might is upsetting Iran's strategy of impoverishing the world by bottling up the Gulf's resources. Thanks to the courage and skill of our service members, and the technical wizards who have found ways to bypass the Strait, more oil is leaving the Gulf now than before the war with Iran began. Gas prices remain high, but the extra output should help drive that down.

America's regional allies are still growing increasingly concerned about our steadfastness. It is not easy to draw a straight line between the foreign policies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. And as the danger from Iran has grown, princes and presidents have tried to reduce the risk of abandonment. Trump is far more willing to confront Iran than any of his predecessors, but his successors will likely be more cautious, particularly if the political cost to this administration is high.

For most of the last decade, numerous allies have tried to tie themselves more closely to the American-led regional order. Most have sought firmer security guarantees. Last year, President Trump designated Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally and stated in an executive order that the United States would defend Qatar if it is attacked. Many of the Abraham Accords nations began coordinating more openly with Israel on defense issues.

Saudi Arabia has also diversified its security portfolio. It signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey in August and activated it earlier this month after the Houthis, Iran's proxy in Yemen, captured the western coast with Iranian help. The Houthis are bombing Saudi airports and other civilian infrastructure and are intensifying their "maritime embargo" in the crucial Bab al-Mandab Strait. Egypt is now preparing to send its own troops to defend Saudi territory, and British fighters are on the way to protect Saudi cities from the air.

The battle against the Houthis could show how far our allies can go without substantial American backing. Yemen is a hard nut to crack. Even with some U.S. intelligence and logistical support, the Saudi-led coalition floundered a decade ago. Israel restored a measure of deterrence in 2025 when it responded to repeated Houthi missile attacks by killing their prime minister and top general, among others, but it is hard to imagine Pakistan or Turkey working productively with the Jewish state.

This coalition is held together by little more than fear of Iran. Historically, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt have jockeyed for preeminence within the region. Saudi Arabia's oil wealth has enabled it to eclipse Egypt as the most prominent Arab state, but it cannot fend off Iran or Turkey on its own. Turkey's history of domination and warmth toward the Muslim Brotherhood alarms many Arab leaders. A security deal with Ankara is a sign of Riyadh's desperation, not its strength.

This coalition is probably too weak and divided to defeat Iran, and since it exists because its members question America's ability to advance their interests, a setback in Yemen is unlikely to redound to Washington's benefit. Hobbling Iran on its own turf, however, could create an environment that America's allies could manage with less assistance. That would make Barrack's statement a cause not for alarm, but for shared vigilance.

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